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INTRODUCTION 
The year was 1963. The Studebaker Corporation, in business for decades producing 
automobiles, closed its South Bend, Indiana plant.1 At the time, around 10,000 current and 
retired employees were receiving or expecting benefits from the company’s pension plan. After 
the close, 3,600 employees already at retirement age received their promised full benefits. But 
the rest of the employees weren’t so lucky. Four thousand workers between the ages of forty and 
fifty-nine who had worked for ten years or more for the company received only 15% of the value 
of their pensions; the remaining 2,900 workers got nothing. Realizing the devastating effect of 
the Studebaker shutdown, Congress sprang into action. In the 1970s, Congress enacted the 
                                                
1 James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation 
and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001). 
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in hopes of establishing sustainable 
retirement packages for American workers. The Act was, and still is, designed to create a 
regulatory scheme to ensure employers properly fund employee retirement plans. ERISA also 
created the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to insure employer-sponsored plans. 
Decades later, Congress enacted the Pension Protection Act (PPA) to address some shortfalls of 
ERISA.  
Despite this regulation, employers are still underfunding pension plans. Facing a grossly 
underfunded pension plan and economic distress, many employers file bankruptcy. Generally, 
bankruptcy provides a “fresh start.” Furthering that policy, most debt is discharged after 
bankruptcy. However, there are some exceptions, specifically the defalcation exception that 
prevents a debtor from discharging a debt if the debtor has acted in such a way that discharge is 
no longer warranted. Reflecting on the growing problem of underfunded pensions and the impact 
of discharge on the innocent employee, some courts have applied the defalcation exception to 
pension-plan sponsors. The result: the debt owed by the pension-plan sponsor to the pension plan 
survives bankruptcy, meaning the debt is still owed to the pensioners. More courts, however, 
have held that the defalcation exception does not apply, instead discharging all of the debt—
including the liability for the underfunded pension plan.  
The fact that there is an incentive to underfund pension plans and then file for bankruptcy 
is concerning. Given the number of underfunded pension plans even after the enactment of 
ERISA and the PPA, something must be done to remedy this problem and create a greater 
incentive for employers to fully fund their pension plans. Part I describes the main types of 
pension plans and the problems arising out of those plans. Part II looks at ERISA and the PPA 
and how they address underfunded pension plans. This Part also evaluates the requirements for 
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creating a fiduciary relationship, a requirement for ERISA liability and application of the 
defalcation exception. Part III summarizes current bankruptcy law, specifically evaluating the 
defalcation exception to discharge and the requirements for establishing a fiduciary relationship 
under the Bankruptcy Code. Part IV argues that the courts should create a presumption of a 
fiduciary relationship for a plan sponsor under the Bankruptcy Code for funds not yet deposited 
into the pension fund. Given the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bullock v. 
BankChampaign, which heightened the standard needed to satisfy the defalcation exception, plan 
sponsors should be sufficiently protected by the Bankruptcy Code, even with this presumption. 
Meanwhile, the presumption would increase accountability for plan sponsors, give pensioners 
more recourse against the plan sponsor, and hopefully reduce the problem of underfunding.  
I. PENSIONS AND THE PBGC—THE PROBLEM 
The use and contents of pension plans have changed over the years. Still, many 
companies utilize some form of a pension plan to create an incentive for their employees to 
remain loyal to the company. The following Part will detail the main pension forms used today 
and will illustrate the problems associated with these pensions. Section A discusses current 
pension plans used by employers today. Section B discusses the problem of underfunded pension 
plans, including specific examples from businesses in bankruptcy.  
A. Pensions in Use Today 
There are two main kinds of pension plans: the defined-benefit plan and the defined-
contribution plan. A defined-benefit plan provides employees with a specified monthly benefit at 
retirement.2 Benefits are often paid out based on a “plan formula that considers such factors as 
salary and service—for example, 1 percent of average salary for the last 5 years of employment 
                                                
2 Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
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for every year of service with the employer.”3  Benefits may also be paid out in a set amount per 
month.4  These plans are employer funded, rather than employee funded, making them the most 
costly and “administratively complex” kind of plan.5 While there used to be some 114,000 
defined-benefit plans in the mid-1980s, there are only about 38,000 of these plans in existence 
today, many of which are held by Americans nearing retirement age.6  
Unlike defined-benefit plans, defined-contribution plans can be funded by the employer, 
the employee, or both.7 The contributing parties contribute an amount, usually set by the terms of 
the plan, per year into an account.8 The money is then invested for the employee through the 
employer’s investment accounts.9 The employee is entitled to the contents of the account upon 
retirement, including any gains or losses from the investment.10 Unlike a defined-benefit plan, 
there is no set amount to be received by the employee at retirement.11 These plans are generally 
more familiar to consumers, as employers have begun using them more frequently. Examples of 
these kinds of plans include the 401(k), 403(b), and Employee Stock Ownership Plan. 
In addition to single employer plans, multiemployer plans have been developed to help 
spread the risk of maintaining a pension plan.12 These plans are funded by multiple companies so 
                                                
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Choosing a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefit Plan, IRS (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-
Plans/Choosing-a-Retirement-Plan:-Defined-Benefit-Plan. 
6 Id. 





12 Lorraine Woellert, Twinkies Bankruptcy Exposes Peril to Some U.S. Pensions: Economy, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 
2014, 10:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-26/twinkies-bankruptcy-raises-specter-of-u-s-pension-




that no one company bears the burden of financing the plan and so the plan can hopefully remain 
after bankruptcy. But that isn’t how it always works out.13  
B. The Growing Problem: Underfunded Pensions 
In the wake of a struggling economy, financially distressed companies have had to take 
drastic action, which has revealed just how deep the recession is. For example, last July, Delphi 
Corporation, which is one of the largest suppliers of auto parts, terminated its pension plans.14 
And Delphi wasn’t alone. It is estimated that in January 2009, the auto industry had unfunded 
pension liabilities of about $42 billion.15 The result: plan participants were left to endure a 
potential loss of several million dollars through reduced benefits.16 When plan liabilities are so 
high, pensioners’ benefits are often reduced, leaving them with considerably less money than 
they had anticipated.17 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is tasked with remedying this 
kind of problem. 
1. The Pension Benefit Guarantee Commission 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was developed in 1974 as part of 
ERISA, essentially as a private-sector insurance company for pension plans.18 Like a traditional 
insurance company, the PBGC collects premiums from employers sponsoring insured pension 
                                                
13 See Id. 
14 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, AUTOMAKER PENSION FUNDING AND 
MULTIPLE FEDERAL ROLES POSE CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/302830.pdf. 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Thought Secure, Pooled Pensions Teeter and Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2014, 
11:20 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/12/thought-secure-pooled-pensions-teeter-and-
fall/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.  
18 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829; (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 
1302(a) (2006)). Specifically, the PBGC was developed to carry out the following tasks: 
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the 
benefit of their participants, 
(2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants and 
beneficiaries under plans to which this subchapter applies, and 
(3) to maintain premiums established by the corporation under section 1306 of this title at the 
lowest level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this subchapter. 
29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012). 
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plans.19 The PBGC is run by the federal government and is headed by a director appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate.20 While the PBGC was established by Congress and is 
operated like a traditional government agency, it receives no funding from Congress.21 Still, 
Congress has full authority to set the premiums to be paid by employers.22 The PBGC insures 
pension plans up to a maximum guaranty, which changes yearly and is affected by the 
employee’s age when the pension is terminated or the employer goes into bankruptcy.23 In 2013, 
the maximum for workers retiring at the age of sixty-five was $57,577.24 per year.24 For 2014, 
the maximum benefit for a sixty-five-year-old employee is $59,318.16.25 According to its 
website, the PBGC insures forty million Americans’ retirement benefits and “is responsible for 
the current and future pensions of about 1.5 million people.”26 The PBGC has reportedly paid out 
around $722 million since 2005 to support failed plans.27 
The PBGC guarantees benefits for the following persons: (1) retirees—both those retiring 
early and at normal retirement age; (2) disabled employees; and (3) survivors of deceased 
                                                
19 Who We Are, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., https://www.pbgc.gov/about/who-we-are.html (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014). The PBGC is also funded by investments and funds received when it takes over a failing pension 
plan. Id. 
20 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a); see also Who We Are, supra note 19. For more on the composition of the board, see § 
1302(d). 
21 PATRICK PURCELL, SUMMARY OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, at CRS-9 (2006), available at 
http://401kpsp.com/indexes/pension%20act%20summary.pdf. 
22 PURCELL, supra note 21. Congress has authorized two kinds of premiums: “a per-capita premium that is charged 
to all sing-employer defined benefit plans and a variable premium charged to underfunded plans equal to $9 per 
$1,000 of underfunding (.9%).” Id. 
23 Who We Are, supra note 19; Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., 
http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-guarantee.html (last visited April 1, 2014) 
(providing the basics of the guarantee and tables detailing maximum payouts by year since 1974). 
24 Who We Are, supra note 19. For more on the benefits guaranteed, see 29 U.S.C. § 1321-23 (2006). 
25 Press Release, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, PBGC Maximum Insurance Benefit Increases for 2014 
(Nov. 6, 2013), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr13-13.html. 
26 Who We Are, supra note 19. “In 2012, the PBGC paid for monthly retirement benefits, up to the guaranteed 
maximum, for nearly 887,000 retirees in 4,500 single-employer and multiemployer pension plans that cannot pay 
promised benefits.” Id. 
27 Woellert, supra note 12; see also PENSION BENEFITS GUARANTY CORPORATION, PENSION INSURANCE TABLES 
(2011), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/pension-insurance-data-tables-2011.pdf. 
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employees.28 The PBGC does not cover health and welfare benefits, life insurance, vacation pay, 
severance pay, or “benefits payable because of disability that occurs after the guarantees take 
effect.”29 In single employer plans, the PBGC generally covers all included benefits for about 
85% of pensioners.30 According to its website, the PBGC takes over pensions: 
• If a sponsoring company seeking to reorganize in bankruptcy proves that it cannot 
remain in business and continue funding the pension plan 
• If a plan runs out of money to pay benefits 
• If a sponsoring company files for liquidation (as opposed to reorganization).31 
 
Many companies have had to seek assistance from the PBGC for these very reasons.  
2. Case Studies 
In 2010, the Government Accountability Office released a report detailing its concerns 
about the GM and Chrysler pension plans following the companies’ 2009 bankruptcies.32 The 
report indicated that the GAO anticipated GM and Chrysler to return to profitability, enabling 
both companies to make up the contributions to their respective plans.33 At the time, GM had to 
make contributions of $5.9 billion in 2013 and $6.4 billion in 2014. Meanwhile, Chrysler had to 
make contributions of $400 million in 2010 and in 2012, $930 million in 2013, and $1.25 billion 
in 2014.34 If GM and Chrysler had not been able to make those contributions, the PBGC would 
have been facing liability of around $14.5 billion, which would have “hit [the PBGC] hard both 
financially and administratively.”35 
                                                
28 PBGC’s Guarantees for Single-Employer Pension Plans, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., 
http://www.pbgc.gov/res/factsheets/page/guar-facts.html (last visited April 1, 2014). 
29 Id. 
30 Press Release, supra note 25. 
31 PBGC’s Guarantees for Single-Employer Pension Plans, supra note 28.  
32 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: AUTOMAKER PENSION FUNDING AND 







While there has been a lot of publicity about underfunded pension plans in the 
automotive sector, the problem is prevalent in many sectors of the economy.36 One observer 
explains that “[t]wo recessions, industry consolidation prompted by deregulation, and an aging 
workforce have funds facing a $400 billion shortfall that has some near insolvency. Dozens 
already have failed, affecting 94,000 participants.”37  Recently, Hostess, the well-known maker 
of Twinkies, went into bankruptcy.38 Ottenberg’s Bakery in Maryland was in a multiemployer 
pension plan with Hostess when Hostess went bankrupt in 2012; the fund was the Bakery and 
Sales Drivers Local 33 Pension Fund.39 With Hostess in bankruptcy with $2 billion liability to its 
multiemployer plans, Ottenberg’s was left to cover the costs of the benefits from the plan.40 In 
bankruptcy, secured creditors get paid out first, often leaving nothing to satisfy the pensions and 
the affected employees.41 In response, the PBGC, for the third time in history,42 partitioned the 
plan to pay out retirement benefits to the 350 affected Hostess employees.43 According to the 
                                                
36 The problem persists in the public sector too. Bloomberg reports that as of 2012, none of the fifty states were 
funded at 100%. Most Underfunded Pension Plans: States, BLOOMBERG: VISUAL DATA, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/visual-data/best-and-worst/most-underfunded-pension-plans-states (last visited Mar. 29, 
2014). Though many were close (funded at around 90%), thirty-eight states were funded below 80%, with another 
four funded just more than 80%. Id.; see also Tim Jones & Brian Chappatta, Illinois Lawmakers Confront Historic 
Burden of Pension Futility, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-
03/illinois-lawmakers-confront-historic-burden-of-pension-futility.html. This, like private-sector pension plans, is a 
growing problem, but given that ERISA applies to private-sector pension plans, the discussion in this Note will be 
limited to private-sector pension plans. 
37 Woellert, supra note 12. 
38 See Alana Semuels, Tiffany Hsu & Emily Bryson York, Hostess Shuttering Doors, Ending Era of Iconic Brand, 
CHICAGO TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-17/business/chi-hostess-brands-seeks-
court-permission-to-liquidate-20121116_1_hostess-brands-gregory-rayburn-madison-zingers (discussing the 
Hostess bankruptcy and the conditions leading up to it). 
39 Woellert, supra note 12. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 The PBGC partitioned pensions “in 1983 to save benefits for restaurant workers and manufacturers in and around 
Detroit[, and i]n 2010, it split a Chicago plan protecting 3,700 truckers and putting 1,500 on government payouts.” 
Woellert, supra note 12. 
43 Press release, Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, PBGC Acts to Help Save Multiemployer Pension Fund 
(Jan. 31, 2014), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr14-02.html. 
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PBGC, the separation was designed to ensure that the plan survives to cover the benefits of the 
other employees in the multiemployer plan.44 
Brad Raymond, General Counsel for the Teamsters, said the union supports PBGC's 
efforts to preserve benefits. “Overall, we think what PBGC is doing offers the best 
chance for struggling pension funds to survive in the context of inadequate bankruptcy 
laws which permit companies to abandon their responsibilities and shift their pension 
commitments to PBGC, other responsible employers, and their workers. We will continue 
to work with PBGC to preserve our members’ pensions.”45 
 
As a result of the partition, the Hostess employees now being paid by the PBGC will 
receive a lesser amount than they would have under the plan—about $520 a month instead of 
$650 a month.46 The 360 employees left in the Bakery and Sales Drivers plan have been merged 
into another plan.47 Plan mergers like this one have been used “to protect benefits of people in 
multiemployer plans. This option enables the plans to combine monetary assets and 
administrative resources so participants have a more secure retirement future.”48 While there was 
a happy ending for the employees in this pension plan, many others do not have such positive 
outcomes.  
The New York Times recently ran a story on a widow whose survivor benefits were 
terminated after the death of her husband.49 Carol Cascio was counting the days before she 
would be able to start collecting his survivor benefits from her husband’s pension plan; she had 
even “borrowed against the promised pension to pay for her daughter’s education.”50 Before that 
day came, her husband’s benefits were terminated. This drastic cut used to be outlawed under the 
anticutback rule, which provided that employers could freeze assets but not terminate them all 
together. That rule was suspended in 2006, “permitting the weakest plans to stop paying certain 
                                                
44 Id. 








benefits to people who had not yet retired, including disability stipends, lump-sum distributions, 
recent pension increases, death benefits and early retirement benefits.”51 Multiemployer plans 
were once thought to be the safest, but now those are even struggling to stay afloat. With the 
PBGC’s multiemployer program collecting only about $110 million in premiums, “[a]ll it would 
take is the failure of one big plan to wipe out the whole program.”52 
II. ERISA AND ESTABLISHING A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP 
Before evaluating the Bankruptcy Code and its applicability to pensions, it is necessary to 
have a basic understanding of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and subsequent 
action taken by Congress regarding pension plans. Section A reviews the history and structure of 
ERISA, and Section B looks at the Pension Protection Act and how Congress tried to use it to fix 
the gaps in ERISA.  
A. ERISA Overview 
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to 
ensure the protection of employee pension plans and other retirement devices.53 Congress 
recognized that “the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent 
years ha[d] been rapid and substantial,” so this expansive Act was developed to provide 
standardized procedures and regulations.54 ERISA provides minimum standards for any private-
sector employer who sponsors a pension plan.55 Among other things, ERISA sets reporting and 
disclosure requirements,56 participation and vesting requirements,57 funding requirements,58 and 
fiduciary responsibility requirements.59  
                                                
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1001-1461 (2006)). 
54 Id. § 1001. 
55 See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (providing that ERISA does not apply to government plans or other public-sector plans). 
56 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31. 
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Most relevant here, ERISA provides that fiduciaries of covered plans are liable for a 
breach of fiduciary duty.60 Under ERISA, a party can be deemed a fiduciary if they are a “named 
fiduciary”61 or if they satisfy the informal requirements under § 1002(21)(A). Named fiduciaries 
are required on every plan or trust instrument; that named person is a fiduciary under ERISA.62 
Further, a person can be considered a fiduciary, even if not specifically named. Pursuant to 
ERISA: 
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any 
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or 
exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) 
he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with 
respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such term includes any person 
designated under section 1105(c)(1)(B) of this title.63 
 
Once a person is determined to be a fiduciary, that person is individually liable for a breach of 
any obligations imposed by ERISA and is liable “to make good to such plan any losses to the 
plan resulting from each such breach.”64 Significantly, the Act limits liability to only those 
breaches that occur after the person has become a fiduciary.65 But, the Act does not clearly 
define “assets,” leaving the courts to determine whether unpaid contributions constitute assets of 
the plan.  
                                                                                                                                                       
57 See id. §§ 1051-61. 
58 See id. §§ 1081-86. 
59 See id. §§ 1101-14. 
60 See id. § 1109 (providing liability for breach of fiduciary duty). 
61 See id. § 1102(a) 
62 Id. § 1103(a). 
63 Id. § 1002(21)(A). 
64 Id. § 1109(a). 
65 Id. § 1109(b). This is particularly important given the circuit spilt in the bankruptcy arena. If one does not become 
a fiduciary under the defalcation exception until after the money is deposited in the pension plan, the defalcation 
exception necessarily cannot apply to except an individual from discharge for failing to deposit funds into the 
pension plan. See infra Sections III.B-D for further discussion. 
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B. The Pension Protection Act 
In 2000, the PBGC had a surplus of $9.7 billion; that surplus drastically declined between 
2001 and 2005 when the PBGC paid out nine of its ten largest claims.66 Those “claims accounted 
for 63% of the total dollar value of claims made on the PBGC since the agency began operating 
in 1975.”67 Those claims left the PBGC with a funding deficit of $22.7 billion.68 In light of the 
growing pension problem and the growing deficit of the PBGC, Congress enacted the Pension 
Protection Act (PPA) in August 2006.69 
More specifically, the PPA was designed to address very pointed shortfalls of ERISA. 
First, under ERISA, underfunded plan sponsors were not required to make additional 
contributions to increase the funding of the plan if the plan was at least 90% funded.70 Moreover, 
because of the accounting process used, the assets and liabilities of plans were not accurately 
calculated under ERISA.71 Also, sponsors were sometimes able to extend amortization out for as 
long as thirty years.72 Lastly, when sponsors made extra contributions in years prior, they were 
not required to make the same level of additional contribution to amortize the fund.73 In other 
words, if a sponsor was below the minimum level of funding, it was required to contribute a 
                                                
66 PURCELL, supra note 21, at CRS-2. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. This was up slightly from the $23.3 billion deficit in 2004. Id. See also Id. at 5 tbl.1 for the top ten largest 
claims paid out by the PBGC from 1975 to 2005. 
69 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); 
PURCELL, supra note 21, at CRS-4. 
70 PURCELL, supra note 21, at CRS-1. 
71 Id. (“Because the interest rates used to calculate current pension plan liabilities were averaged over a four-year 
period and asset values used to calculate minimum funding requirements could be averaged over five years, neither 
plan assets nor liabilities were measured accurately.”). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. (“Some sponsors of underfunded pensions were able to avoid making contributions to their plans for several 
years because they had made contributions beyond the required minimum in the past. The use of these so-called 
‘credit balances’ led to greater underfunding of pension plans, according to the Administration’s analysis.”). 
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minimum amount each year. If the sponsor contributed more than the minimum amount in one 
year, the sponsor’s minimum contribution in the next year would be reduced.74  
Under the PPA, plan sponsors have a shorter time, only seven years, to amortize an 
underfunded plan.75 As under ERISA, plan sponsors can still offset the repayment amount using 
credit balances,76 but only once the plan is funded at 80% or more. In addition, the value of the 
credit balance must be “adjusted to reflect the changes in the market value of the plan assets 
since the date of the contributions that created the credit balances were made.”77 
New provisions for multiemployer plans were also implemented. At the beginning of the 
plan year, the plan sponsors must certify the funding status of the plan for the year and project 
the funding status for the next six years.78 Under the new provisions, plans can be characterized 
as being in “critical status,” whereby sponsors have a year to develop a rehabilitation plan and 
have ten years to move out of critical status.79 The PPA provides similar provisions for plans 
categorized as “endangered”80 and “seriously endangered.”81 
                                                
74 See Credit Balances in Defined Benefit Pension Plans, ERISA INDUS. COMM. (June 29, 2005), 
http://www.eric.org/forms/uploadFiles/37B400000002.filename.Credit_Balance_Document.pdf. 
75 Id. at CRS-3. 
76 The credit balance is the amount of the contribution a sponsor makes in excess of the minimum contribution. 
Credit Balances in Defined Benefit Pension Plans, supra note 74.  
77 PURCELL, supra note 21, at CRS-4. 
78 Id. at CRS-10. 
79 Id. at CRS-11. A plan is considered to be in critical status if:  
(1) it is less than 65% funded and has a projected funding deficiency within five years or will be 
unable to pay benefits within seven years; (2) it has a projected funding deficiency within four 
years or will be unable to pay benefits within five years (regardless of its funded percentage; or (3) 
its liabilities for inactive participants are greater than its liabilities for active participants, its 
contributions are less than carrying costs, and a funding deficiency is projected within five years. 
Id. at CRS-11. Plan sponsors have ten years to rehabilitate the plan “from the earlier of (1) two years after adoption 
of the rehabilitation plan or (2) the first plan year after the beginning of collective bargaining agreements covering 
75% of active participants.” Id. at CRS-12. 
80 Id. at CRS-11. A plan is considered to be endangered if it is “less than 80% funded or if the plan is projected to 
have a funding deficiency within seven years.” Id. Sponsors have one year to implement an improvement plan and 
ten years to improve funding. Id. 
81 Id. A seriously endangered plan are one that that “less than 80% funded and is projected to have a funding 
deficiency within seven years.” Id. These plans must improve funding within fifteen years.  
They must improve their funding percentage by one-fifth of the difference between 100% funding 
and the plan’s funded percentage from the earlier of (1) two years after the adoption of the funding 
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III. DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY 
Bankruptcy has long been a refuge for debtors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide 
discharge of prepetition debts for debtors—to give debtors a “fresh start.” Bankruptcy protects 
debtors from creditors in the event that they cannot repay their debts. On the other hand, the 
rights of creditors need to be protected by the Bankruptcy Code to ensure stability of our 
economy.   
A.  Basic Overview of Bankruptcy 
A debtor, whether an individual or a corporation, can seek refuge in bankruptcy under 
either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.82 Chapter 7 is the liquidation chapter. A debtor liquidates all of 
his or her assets, minus any exempt property, to pay off all of the debtor’s creditors. Often times, 
the debtor will not be able to pay off all of the creditors, but the unpaid debt is discharged in 
bankruptcy. In a Chapter 7 case, the pension plan ceases to exist because all assets are liquidated 
and the company ceases to exist.83  In a Chapter 11 case, the debtor can reorganize the business 
or liquidate it. The debtor often remains in possession of the company and continues operating it 
during the bankruptcy. To be granted discharge, the debtor must propose a plan that is acceptable 
to the creditors.84 Holders of claims in an impaired class must accept the plan or be entitled to 
payment of as much as the holder would have received under Chapter 7, also known as the best 
interest of the creditors test.85 If the plan impairs multiple classes of claims, at least one 
                                                                                                                                                       
improvement plan or (2) the first plan year after the expiration of collective bargaining agreements 
that cover at least 75% of the plan’s active participant. 
Id.  
82 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (2006); see also Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) (providing that individuals may 
file under 11). Given the scope of this Note, the discussion will be limited to bankruptcy cases in either Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 11. Chapter 13 is also an option for individual debtors who wish to reorganize. But, Chapter 13 is not 
applicable to corporations, so under the circumstances discussed in this Note, Chapter 13 is not relevant. 
83 Fact Sheet: Your Employer’s Bankruptcy—How Will It Affect Your Employee Benefits?, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsbankruptcy.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). For more on collection, 
liquidation, and distribution of the bankruptcy estate, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 721-27. 
84 11 U.S.C. § 1129.  
85 Id. § 1129(a)(7).  
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noninsider class must accept the plan before it can be confirmed as a consent plan.86 If the plan is 
not accepted by all of the classes of creditors, the cramdown provisions must be satisfied.87 The 
plan must be fair and equitable with the secured creditor cramdown, and the absolute priority 
rule applies with an unsecured creditor cramdown.88 In a Chapter 11 case, the pension plan may 
continue through reorganization.89  
When properly funded and maintained, pension plans are not at risk in bankruptcy 
because payments made by the employee or withheld by the employer for an employee-benefit 
plan are not considered assets in the bankruptcy estate.90 The bankruptcy estate does not include 
employee contributions to a qualified defined-benefit plan, “even if the contributions have not 
yet been deposited with the plan.”91 But, it is not clear whether employer contributions become 
part of the bankruptcy estate,92 raising an issue regarding the defalcation exception.  
B. Defalcation Exception 
The Bankruptcy Code provides some protection for creditors in § 523.93 Section 523 as a 
whole prevents debtors from discharging certain kinds of debts. Some of the exceptions from 
discharge in § 523 are based on the nature of the debt, while others are based on bad conduct by 
                                                
86 Id. § 1129(a)(10); CHRISTOPHER STRICKLAND & W. HOMER DRAKE, JR., CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS § 14:12 
(2d ed. 2013).  
87 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).  
88 Id.; see also Richard F. Hahn & Jasmine Ball, Plan Formation and Confirmation, in COLLIER GUIDE TO CHAPTER 
11: KEY TOPICS AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES ¶ 1.12(1)(C) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 2013) 
(explaining that the “court must find that the plan is ‘fair and equitable’ with respect to the dissenting class and that 
it does not discriminate unfairly against the dissenting class”). The absolute priority rule requires the parties in the 
dissenting class to “receive in full the allowed amounts of their claims if any class junior to the dissenting class 
receives or retains any property on account of their claims or interests.” Id. 
89 Fact Sheet: Your Employer’s Bankruptcy—How Will It Affect Your Employee Benefits?, supra note 83; 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1141 (detailing the effect of plan confirmation).  
90 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7). 
91 Lee T. Polk, Benefits Related Litigation: Specific Settings and Selected Topics, ERISA PRAC. & LITIGATION § 
12:21 (2013); 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7) (providing that amounts withheld by the employer from an employee for 
defined benefit plan are not part of the bankruptcy estate). 
92 Polk, supra note 91. 
93 11 U.S.C. 523. 
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the debtor.94 One of the many exceptions to discharge is defalcation. Bankruptcy Code § 
523(a)(4) specifically provides an exception to discharge to an individual debtor if the debtor is 
involved in “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.”95 Defalcation is 
colloquially defined as “the act or an instance of embezzling” or “a failure to meet a promise or 
an expectation.”96 But, the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a definition for defalcation or 
provide any guidance as to what constitutes defalcation under the code. As a result, the lower 
courts have established their own standards and principals to handle defalcation cases.  
Notably, § 523(a)(4) is currently only applicable to individual debtors, rather than 
corporations. Thus, the applicability of this exception is relatively limited, given that most 
employers who have any obligation to make payments are typically not individuals. But, this is 
applicable to individual debtors operating as sole proprietors or individual debtors who assume 
individual liability for the plan. For example, individuals may assume liability to make payments 
under a collective bargaining agreement.97 Once an individual assumes liability to make 
payments, that person may be subject to the defalcation exception if the individual goes into 
bankruptcy with the company.  
Beyond that, courts struggled for years to determine the meaning of “defalcation” and, 
specifically, the state of mind required to constitute defalcation. Several courts differed on the 
state of mind needed to constitute defalcation. In Bullock v. BankChampaign, the Supreme Court 
answered that question, finding that a heightened standard is required.98 Prior to Bullock, courts 
                                                
94 An additional protection for creditors can be found in 11 U.S.C. § 727. While § 523 provides that specific debts 
are non-dischargeable, § 727 applies globally, meaning that if the requirements are satisfied, all of the debtors debt 
will be non-dischargeable.  
95 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4). 
96 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/defalcation (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
97 See, e.g., In re Tsikouris, 340 B.R. 604 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (detailing an individual’s contractual obligation to make 
payments to a pension plan); Trustees of the Conn. Pipe Trades Local 777 Health Fund v. Nettleton Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 279, 281 (D. Conn. 2007). 
98 Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013). 
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applied three different standards for defalcation. The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts 
adopted a negligence standard, the lowest standard adopted by the courts.99 The First and Second 
Circuits applied a scienter or extreme recklessness standard, the highest standard adopted by the 
courts.100 Lastly, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits applied an intermediate 
standard requiring objective recklessness.101 The Bullock Court resolved this issue by holding 
that in the absence of “bad faith, moral turpitude, or other immoral conduct, the term 
[defalcation] requires an intentional wrong.”102 More specifically, the Court stated: 
We include as intentional not only conduct that the fiduciary knows is improper but also 
reckless conduct of the kind that the criminal law often treats as the equivalent. Thus, we 
include reckless conduct of the kind set forth in the Model Penal Code. Where actual 
knowledge of wrongdoing is lacking, we consider conduct as equivalent if the fiduciary 
“consciously disregards” (or is willfully blind to) “a substantial and unjustifiable risk” 
that his conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty. That risk “must be of such a 
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard 
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.”103 
 
In short, defalcation requires an intentional wrong or a conscious disregard of a “substantial and 
unjustifiable risk” involving a gross deviation from the standard of conduct required of a 
person.104 This decision will undoubtedly restrict the application of the defalcation exception 
globally, but particularly with regard to the pension problem. 
C. What Is a Fiduciary Relationship? 
Before a claim can be deemed nondischargable under the defalcation exception, there 
must be a fiduciary relationship. In Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., the Supreme Court explained 
                                                
99 In re Sherman, 658 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2011); In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2001). 
100 See, e.g., In re Hyman, 502 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that this standard “has the virtue of ease of 
application since the courts and litigants have reference to a robust body of securities law examining what these 
terms mean”); In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2002). 
101 See, e.g., In re Felt, 255 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2001). 
102 Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759.  




that the meaning of this term is both fixed by judicial construction and interpreted narrowly.105 
Moreover, the Court stressed that “the statute ‘speaks of technical trusts, and not those which the 
law implies from the contract,” so “[t]he scope of the exception was to be limited 
accordingly.”106 Given that, § 523(a)(4) is relevant to determine whether a person is a fiduciary 
for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, but state law determines whether a trust relationship is 
established. For example, a trust and fiduciary relationship can be created when parties enter 
“into an agency agreement under which the debtor’s agency [is] appointed and authorized to be 
an issuing agent for the creditor and where such agreement establishe[s] an express trust under 
state law.”107 Additionally, the courts have addressed a variety of contexts in which a fiduciary 
relationship can be created when the debtor is “engaged in the sale, purchase, or lease of goods 
or services, other than financial, investment, or banking services or products.”108 Importantly, in 
order for a person to be considered a fiduciary, the person “must have been a trustee before the 
wrong” occurred.109 Similarly, a label alone is not enough; the substance of a relationship is the 
key to establishing a fiduciary relationship.110 
There are three main kinds of trusts: express, constructive, and statutory. These trusts are 
treated differently under the Bankruptcy Code, and courts have not agreed on how bankruptcy 
applies to each.111 First, express trusts are generally found to create a fiduciary relationship, 
                                                
105 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (explaining that the court must ask whether the petitioner “[w]as a trustee in that strict 
and narrow sense”). 
106 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (citations omitted). 
107 Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Who Is Acting in “Fiduciary Capacity” Within Meaning of Fraud or Defalcation 
Discharge Exception in Bankruptcy, 15 A.L.R. FED. 2d 337 (2006).  
108 Id. Some of the industries where such a relationship has been found include (1) transportation (motor vehicles, 
aviation and marine, and freight services); (2) construction and heavy machinery/building supplies; (3) petroleum; 
(4) agriculture; (5) food and beverage; (6) consumer goods and services; (7) computer equipment supplies; (8) 
health and pharmaceutical; (9) travel, recreation, and leisure; (10) insurance; (11) real estate. Id.  
109 Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934). 
110 Id. 
111 Deborah L. Thorne & Kevin G. Collins, Are All Trusts Equal Under § 523(a)(4)? An Examination of PACA and 
Other Statutorily Created Trusts, ABI JOURNAL, Dec.-Jan. 2013 at 80 (providing sources for the split on this issue). 
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potentially allowing for a claim for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(4).112 To establish an 
express trust, the plaintiff must show the following: “(1) an intent to create a trust; (2) a trustee; 
(3) a trust res; and (4) a definite beneficiary.”113 Constructive trusts are “found to be implied by 
the court only as a result of existing debts and not prior to the debt being incurred.”114 Because 
the fiduciary relationship must arise before the act of defalcation, constructive trusts are 
generally not sufficient under § 523(a)(4).115 While express trusts are generally treated as 
“actual” trusts in bankruptcy, statutory trusts have not uniformly been dealt with by the lower 
bankruptcy courts.116 Courts are split on whether the obligation under a statutory trust arises 
before any wrongdoing or only after the payment obligation matures and is wrongfully 
withheld.117 Specifically, “[o]nce a statutory trust intersects with the Bankruptcy Code, [statutory 
trusts] can be disturbed by courts determining that the relationship, even though called a ‘trust,’ 
does not amount to a fiduciary relationship or that the failure to pay is not defalcation.”118 
D. Does a Fiduciary Relationship Exist for Pension Sponsors? 
Courts across the country have not uniformly agreed that the establishment of a fiduciary 
relationship under ERISA is sufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship for the purpose of the 
defalcation exception under the Bankruptcy Code. For example, in In re Tsikouris, the 
                                                
112 Id. 
113 In re Blaszak, 397 F.3d 386, 391-92 (6th Cir. 2005). 
114 Thorne & Collins, supra note 111, at 81. 
115 See, e.g., In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (“From 1884 to present, courts have construed 
‘fiduciary’ in the bankruptcy discharge context as including express trusts, but excluding trusts ex maleficio, i.e., 
trusts that arose by operation of law upon wrongful act.”); Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 
(1934). 
116 Some of the confusion, however, stems from courts classifying trusts established under ERISA differently. For 
example, some courts say that these are express trusts; others classify them as statutory trusts. See, e.g., In re 
Engleman, 271 B.R. 366, 368 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (holding that a statutory trust is not sufficient to create a 
fiduciary capacity under § 523(a)(4)); In re Parker, 388 B.R. 11, 18 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008) (providing that an 
express trust is necessary, but finding that the ERISA plans constitute trusts for purpose of § 523(a)(4)).  
117 Thorne & Collins, supra note 111, at 81. 
118 Id.; see also In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that fiduciary relationships created 
by statute can satisfy the fiduciary requirement under § 523(a)(4) “if the statute: (1) defines the trust res; (2) 




Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District in Indiana held that there was no fiduciary 
relationship before pension-plan funds were deposited.119 In other words, because the funds had 
never been deposited into the pension plan, there was no trust res at the time of the bankruptcy 
and therefore no fiduciary relationship.120 So, even though the debtor was individually obligated 
by contract to make payments into the pension plan, the court held that § 523(a)(4) was 
inapplicable, and the debt was dischargeable.121 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
held that the defalcation exception does not apply in a situation where the debtor, the president 
and sole shareholder of his company, enters into a collective bargaining agreement that 
contractually obligates him to make contributions to a pension plan.122 Later, in In re Halpin, the 
Second Circuit, relying on informal opinions from the Department of Labor, came to the 
conclusion that “‘employer contributions become an asset of the plan only when the contribution 
has been made.’”123 The court stated: 
Moreover, if unpaid employer contributions were plan assets, the employer would 
automatically become an ERISA fiduciary once it failed to make the payments. As such, 
the employer would owe the plan undivided loyalty at the expense of competing 
obligations—some fiduciary—to the business, and to others such as employees, 
customers, shareholders and lenders, and an undifferentiated portion of the company’s 
assets would be held in trust for the plan. It is difficult to envision how proprietors could 
ever operate a business enterprise under such circumstances. It is highly unlikely—indeed 
inconceivable—that Congress intended such a result.124 
 
                                                
119 340 B.R. 604, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006). 
120 Id. (explaining that “there must be a ‘res’ in existence before the designated ‘fiduciary’ relationship truly arises[, 
so] because there was no ‘res’ prior to that time, Tsikouris did not act in a ‘fiduciary capacity’ in any manner with 
respect to the ‘debt’ which the Plaintiffs seek to exempt from discharge”); see also In re Halpin, 566 F.3d 286 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (holding that unpaid contributions are not assets of the plan under ERISA and only become sets of the 
plan once they are paid—not once they are due). 
121 In re Tsikouris, 340 B.R. at 614. 
122 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2007). 
123 In re Halpin, 566 F.3d at 292 (quoting Employee Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Field Assistance 
Bulletin 2008–1, at 1-2 (Feb. 1, 2008)). 
124 In re Halpin, 566 F.3d at 292. 
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So, even though the plan documents required the employer to make a contribution, the court held 
that the document did not create an interest in the funds not yet deposited into the pension 
fund.125  
 On the other hand, some circuits have found that the plan sponsors, or those who meet 
ERISA’s functional test126 for fiduciary status, do meet the fiduciary requirement under § 
523(a)(4).127 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly stated that fiduciaries under ERISA 
are also fiduciaries within the meaning of § 523(a)(4).128 The Hemmeter court explained that “a 
statutory fiduciary is considered a fiduciary for the purposes of § 523(a)(4) if the statute: (1) 
defines the trust res; (2) identifies the fiduciary’s management duties; and (3) imposes 
obligations on the fiduciary prior to the alleged wrongdoing.”129 The plan sponsor in Hemmeter 
had discretion to control the assets of the plan, the plan identified the trust res when the trust was 
created, and ERISA defined the fiduciary’s duties; therefore, the sponsor was a fiduciary under 
both the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA.130 The Hemmeter court, though not limiting its decision, 
did not specifically address unpaid employer contributions to the pension plan, but instead 
addressed the declining balance of a pension plan.131 Still, the court found that a statutory 
fiduciary was also a fiduciary under the defalcation exception. The court’s conclusion that an 
ERISA fiduciary satisfies the fiduciary requirement under § 523(a)(4) suggests that this rationale 
                                                
125 Id. at 289. 
126 See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (explaining that ERISA defines a fiduciary “not in 
terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan”).  
127 Emil Khatchatourian & Brendan M. Gage, Unpaid ERISA Contributions and Fiduciary Liability Under § 
523(a)(4), ABI J., Nov. 2013, at 52; see also Jennifer Liotta, Comment, ERISA Fiduciaries in Bankruptcy: 
Preserving Individual Liability for Defalcation, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 725, 733-41 (2006) (discussing the 
functional fiduciary under ERISA). 
128 See In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). 
129 Id. at 1190. 
130 Id. 
131 See generally id.; Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 127. 
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and analysis could also be applied in an underfunded pension case. In fact, other courts have 
similarly held that ERISA plans meet the requirements for express trusts.132 
 Some courts have held that unpaid contributions can be plan assets if the trust agreement 
specifically defines them as such. For example, in Trustees of the Connecticut Pipe Trades Local 
777 Health Fund v. Nettleton Mechanical Contractors, Inc., the court allowed an action to 
recover the employer’s unpaid contributions to the plan.133 In Nettleton, the pensioners sued both 
the company and its president Romaniello for failure to pay required contributions.134 
Romaniello entered into a collective bargaining agreement in which he agreed to pay 
contributions into a multiemployer plan.135 The terms of the agreement specifically provided that 
the plan assets included “‘sums of money that have been or shall be paid to the Pension Fund by 
the Employers as contributions required by’” the agreement.136 Given the unambiguous terms of 
the agreement, the Court held that the unpaid contributions were in fact plan assets.137 The court 
distinguished the facts in Nettleton from those in a Tenth Circuit case, explaining that there was 
no ambiguity in the plan agreement that would prevent the unpaid contributions from being 
considered plan assets.138 Ultimately, the court held Romaniello liable for the breach of fiduciary 
duty stemming from his decision to pay other creditors instead of the pension fund.139 
                                                
132 See, e.g., In re Fahey, 482 B.R. 678, 689 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012); In re Duncan, 331 B.R. 70, 78 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 
2005); Eavenson v. Ramey, 243 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999). 
133 478 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D. Conn. 2007). 
134 Id. at 281. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. (emphasis added). 
137 Id. at 283; see also Trustees of the Southern California Pipe Trades Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Temecula 
mech., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (C.D. Cali. 2006) (explaining that the general rule that contributions are not 
plan assets until paid “gives way to the face of language in the plan document identifying unpaid employer 
contributions as plan assets”). 
138Nettleton, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 283; In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying the common definition of 
asset, the court held that there was only a contractual right to collect the unpaid contributions, but the unpaid 
contributions were not plan assets).  
139 Nettleton, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (“Thus, when Nettleton experienced financial difficulty, Romaniello breached 
his fiduciary duty when he exercised his authority to pay other creditors instead of National Funds.”).  
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IV. WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN? 
In reflecting on the continued problem of underfunded pension plans and the inconsistent 
approach by the lower courts, it is time a consistent, comprehensive approach be taken to remedy 
the situation. Overly simplifying the issue, if an employer is on the brink of bankruptcy, the 
likelihood that that employer is maintaining his or her pension fund is slim. Once the employer 
goes into bankruptcy, the majority of courts have said that the employer is not liable for having 
underfunded that pension plan. Employees are then left to pick up the pieces, having relied on 
their pension plans being fully funded. But how can the legislature and the courts remedy this 
situation without making it impossible for employers to utilize the “fresh start” so deeply 
engrained in the bankruptcy system? Remember, Chapter 11 requires plan confirmation. Plan 
confirmation may be more difficult if unpaid contributions are treated as nondischargeable debt. 
Alternatively, if the employer is entirely off the hook for the underfunded portion, the system 
incentivizes employers to underfund their pension plans knowing they can avoid paying the 
contributions through a bankruptcy procedure—all the while leaving the employees out in the 
cold. The remaining pages of this Note addresses this very tension in hopes of suggesting an 
alternative system that would better protect the employees who have paid into and relied on their 
pension plans and that would carry out the overarching goals of the bankruptcy system.  
To address this tension, the courts and the legislature ought to create a presumption of 
fiduciary capacity under the Bankruptcy Code for pension-plan sponsors who satisfy the 
requirements to be considered a fiduciary under ERISA. Next, the courts should consider unpaid 
pension funds to be plan assets if the plan documents include such in their terms. Then, the 
courts should apply the heightened standard set out in Bullock to determine whether a defalcation 
has occurred when the plan sponsor fails to fully fund a pension plan. Before going any further, 
it is important to reiterate that the defalcation exception will only be applicable in a limited 
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number of situations. Because defalcation applies only to individuals, this resolution will only be 
applicable in situations where a debtor–sponsor goes into bankruptcy with the company. But, this 
proposal balances the interests of all parties involved and could reduce the strain on the PBGC 
and the affected employees.  
A. Unpaid, but Due, Contributions Should Be Considered Plan Assets 
Before a fiduciary responsibility can be created, there must be plan assets available. As 
the court in Halpin recognized, “if unpaid employer contributions were plan assets, the employer 
would automatically become an ERISA fiduciary once it failed to make the payments.”140 But 
not all courts agree that unpaid contributions constitute plan assets. Given that ERISA does not 
specifically define “assets” to be only monies paid, courts like the Halpin court should start 
incorporating unpaid contributions into their definition of “assets.” First, it may be overreaching 
to suggest that unpaid contributions should always be considered to be plan assets. For example, 
if the plan documents provide that an employer can make discretionary payments into the 
pension plan, then it might be conceivable that those discretionary payments not be considered 
plan assets. But, when the plan documents specifically state that plan assets include amounts that 
shall be paid by the plan sponsor, then the court should uniformly find that unpaid contributions 
are assets under ERISA. Courts that have not found such payments to be plan assets have looked 
at the dictionary and common law definitions of “asset.”141 But, when the parties specifically 
contract to include something else in the definition of asset, the court ought to apply the terms as 
contracted by the parties, especially given that “asset” is not specifically defined in ERISA. 
                                                
140 In re Halpin, 566 F.3d 286, 292 (2d Cir. 2009); see also supra notes 123-125 (discussing this case). 
141 See, e.g., In re Halpin, 566 F.3d at 289 (providing that “[i]n the absence of a formal rule or regulation, the 
Department has informally advised that ‘the assets of a plan generally are to be identified on the basis of ordinary 
notions of property rights under non-ERISA law’”).  
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The resulting problem is that employers may make pension plans discretionary. In other 
words, employers may draft their pension plans to provide that all employer contributions are 
discretionary, thereby exempting them from this presumption. At that point, the courts will be 
forced to reevaluate this standard to ensure equitable distribution. Alternatively, and probably 
more likely, the court could just evaluate discretionary funding decisions more carefully under 
the Bullock standard.142 For multiemployer plans, however, this likely will not create a problem. 
Since multiemployer plans are funded by several different companies, each individual sponsor 
wants the contributions from every other sponsor to be mandatory to ensure that no one sponsor 
bears the weight of funding the entire plan.  
B. A Fiduciary Under ERISA Should Satisfy the Fiduciary Requirement Under § 523(a)(4) 
The next step to implementing this proposal is to establish that a fiduciary under ERISA 
is a fiduciary under the Bankruptcy Code. As discussed above, courts have disagreed on this 
issue. Applying the Davis standard, which requires the courts interpret the term “fiduciary” 
under the Bankruptcy Code very narrowly, some courts have refused to find a presumption of 
fiduciary responsibility under the Bankruptcy Code when a party is a fiduciary under ERISA. 
But, other courts have not had such a difficult time. These courts, looking at the actual 
requirements for the creation of a fiduciary relationship under the Bankruptcy Code, find that 
each of the elements is satisfied by the creation of the plan. To create a fiduciary relationship, 
there must be a trust. The following requirements must be included for a trust to be created: it 
must “(1) define[] the trust res; (2) identif[y] the fiduciary’s management duties; and (3) 
impose[] obligations on the fiduciary prior to the alleged wrongdoing.”143 Every pension plan 
could be found to satisfy each of the elements. In creating a pension plan, the creators must 
                                                
142 Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013). 




develop a plan agreement in writing.144 In that agreement, plan creators can specify the trust res. 
Specifically, ERISA requires the plan set out a procedure to establish and carry out a funding 
policy and “specify the basis on which payments are to be made to and from the plan.”145 
Additionally, the plan document must set out managerial responsibilities.146 Moreover, ERISA 
establishes the duties of the fiduciary, as required to create a fiduciary relationship under the 
Bankruptcy Code.147 Further, ERISA specifically provides that benefits shall be held in trust.148 
While not conclusive that this rationale transfers over to the bankruptcy arena, the presence of an 
express trust should carry over to bankruptcy and the defalcation exception.  
Some courts, however, have interpreted the fiduciary duty under ERISA in a way that 
prohibits a presumption like the one suggested. The Fourth Circuit has said: 
[F]iduciary status is an all-or-nothing concept. However, the inclusion of the phrase “to 
the extent” in § 1002(21)(A) means that a party is a fiduciary only as to the activities 
which bring the person within the definition. The statutory language plainly indicates that 
the fiduciary function is not an indivisible one. In other words, a court must ask whether a 
person is a fiduciary with respect to the particular activity at issue.149 
 
Given this language, it is possible that a court would be hesitant to apply a presumption in favor 
of finding a fiduciary duty regarding unpaid plan assets without further inquiring into the specific 
activities at issue. But, with regard to unpaid contributions when a trust document 
unambiguously provides that such payments must be made, the court should be able to classify 
                                                
144 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2006) (“Every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a 
written instrument.”).  
145 Id. § 1102(b)(1), (4). Moreover, the plan must “describe any procedure under the plan for allocation of 
responsibilities for the operation and administration of the plan” and provide procedures for amending the plan. Id. § 
1102(b)(2)-(3).  
146 Id. § 1102; see also supra note 145 (detailing the requirements for a plan).  
147 Id. § 1104. 
148 Id. § 1103 (2006) (“[A]ll assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees. . . . 
[T]he trustee or trustees shall have exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan.”).  
149 Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 61 (4th Cir. 1992).  
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these situations alike by applying a presumption.150 Such presumption is necessary because 
courts have not treated unpaid assets alike, even when the trust document unambiguously 
provides that unpaid, but due, contributions are plan assets. 
Courts and bankruptcy scholars alike may, however, be hesitant to impose such a strong 
presumption for fear that it would ultimately undermine the purpose of bankruptcy. For example, 
Emil Khatchatourian and Brendan M. Gage explain, “Broadly construing ‘fiduciary capacity’ 
undermines the ‘fresh start’ policy that Congress sought to give to the ‘honest but unfortunate 
debtor.’”151 Even though the debtor acted in good faith in the time before bankruptcy and 
through plan confirmation, trying to pay off all of its debts, there may be fear that the court could 
still deny discharge of the pension-plan liability, undermining the fresh start policy. If a 
presumption were applied, some may argue that the courts will be free to refuse discharge for 
any debtor, regardless of wrongdoing.  
This concern, however, is quelled by the Court’s recent decision in Bullock. The Bullock 
Court solidified a heightened standard for defalcation. As a result, the ability of pensioners to 
establish a defalcation will be limited to only those cases where the fiduciary engages in 
intentional wrongdoing or consciously disregards the risk; that is a high standard to satisfy.152 
Applying this standard strictly would allow the courts to punish plan sponsors who wrongfully 
withhold funds from the pension plan. It would also curtail the sponsor’s practice of always 
paying creditors rather than the pension plan. 
                                                
150 See, e.g., ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that had the agreement 
unambiguously provided that unpaid employer contributions were plan assets, the employer would be considered a 
fiduciary).  
151 Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 127, at 53. 
152 See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text for more on the Bullock decision. 
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 Perhaps more troubling is the possibility that this presumption would create “potentially 
irreconcilable fiduciary obligations.”153 Upon insolvency, a fiduciary may owe a fiduciary duty 
to its general creditors under state law.154 Judge Kornreich reflected upon this problem in his 
dissenting opinion in Fahey after the court found a plan sponsor was a fiduciary under the 
Bankruptcy Code with regard to unpaid contributions.155 Judge Kornreich explained:  
The majority decision places the responsible officer of an insolvent corporation in 
jeopardy of violating a state law fiduciary duty if he or she chooses to distribute corporate 
assets to employee benefit funds in an effort to avoid a judgment under § 523(a)(4). 
Ironically, such a distribution could give rise to a sustainable, nondischargeable claim 
under § 523(a)(4) for breach of a state law duty.156 
 
But, as a matter of policy, should we accept that it is of greater importance to pay off one’s other 
creditors while neglecting the employees who make the company what it is? We have come to 
accept that it is okay to put the employees’ benefits and well-being to the side to ensure financial 
gain for the company. While that is one of the basic necessities of a capitalistic society, it has 
also become so engrained in us that we forget to reflect on the other options. To maintain our 
economy and to ensure employees have gainful employment, we obviously need successful 
companies. But, that does not explain our willingness to discount an employer’s obligation to its 
employees, evidenced in a written pension-plan agreement, when compared to the company’s 
obligations to the employer’s other creditors.  
CONCLUSION 
ERISA and the PPA were both enacted to protect pensioners from underfunded and failed 
pension plans. Even with the amendments to ERISA and the enactment of the PPA, pension-plan 
sponsors continue to underfund pension plans. While both of these acts have significantly 
                                                
153 Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 127, at 53. 
154 Id.; see also In re Fahey, 482 B.R. 678, 697 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012) (Kornreich, J., dissenting). Upon impending 
bankruptcy, some courts hold that common law fiduciary duties are owed to a company’s creditors.  
155 See generally In re Fahey, 482 B.R. 678. 
156 Id. at 697 (Kornreich, J., dissenting); see also Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 127, at 53 & n.38. 
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advanced the protections afforded to pensioners, more can be done to protect employees from 
underfunded plans and to encourage employers to fully fund their pension plans. To do that, 
courts ought to apply a uniform framework, generally finding that a fiduciary under ERISA is a 
fiduciary under § 523(a)(4) with respect to underfunded pension plans. To protect the integrity 
and purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, the courts should rely on Bullock’s mental state 
requirement to reduce the number of debtors who are unable to confirm a plan in bankruptcy. 
Applying the heightened standard in Bullock will reduce the applicability of the defalcation 
exception, leaving it applicable only in the most serious cases of impropriety. Ultimately, this 
new system will protect more employees, reduce strain on the PBGC, and create an incentive for 
employers to prioritize funding their pension plans.  
